Why do helicopters crash? 💥

Every year, EASA releases a great document that helps to answer this question, and shows what’s catching pilots out, what’s killing crew, breaking aircraft, and coming back to screw up flight safety across Europe 🇪🇺

It’s a goldmine of information, so we’re going to show you the main take-aways in one overview.

No theories, no hangar talk, just hard data from every rotorcraft accident and serious incident in the last 12 months, compared to the last 11 years!

It’s broken down into 4 sections:

🔸 All Helicopter Operations
🔸 Commercial Air Transport (CAT)
🔸 Specialised Operations (SPO)
🔸 Non-Commercial Operations (NCO)

If you fly, teach, or manage helicopter ops, this is what you need to know before the next briefing!

*A little side-note: At this moment in time, EASA does not provide data on total helicopter movements per year, so drawing conclusions based on this data remains tricky – as we can’t correct for an increase or decrease in overall traffic. The same applies to the difference in reporting culture over time (for serious incidents).

🔄 All Helicopter Operations

Let’s start with the bad news: 2024 had the most helicopter occurances of the last 12 years.

Let’s recap the average amount over the last 11 years first:

🔸 13.9 serious incidents
🔸 36.7 non-fatal accidents
🔸 8.5 fatal accidents

But as you can see in this graph, 2024 was worse:

EASA Safety Review 2025

We had:

⬆️ 38 serious incidents
⬆️ 37 non-fatal accidents
⬇️ 7 fatal accidents

So, less fatal accidents than the average, but more serious incidents and non-fatal accidents.

The silver lining is that fatalities have not increased compared to the other years. The 11 year averages are:

🔸 11.2 serious injuries
🔸 20 fatalities

While 2024 had:

⬆️ 14 serious injuries
⬇️ 14 fatalities

Take a look:

EASA Safety Review 2025

So what are the main accidents types over the last 5 years?

The top 5 looks slightly different to last year’s summary:

1️⃣ Loss of control in flight
2️⃣ Unknown (undetermined)
3️⃣ Abnormal runway contact
4️⃣ Airprox / ACAS alert / loss of separation / mid-air collissions
5️⃣ Collision with obstacles during take-off and landing

Here’s all of them listed based on amount of occurrences:

EASA Safety Review 2025

This means powerplant failure is no longer in the top 5, and abnormal runway contact has overtaken the airprox category.

EASA summarises that the top risks (remain) loss of control in flight, airborne collisions, and terrain collisions.

A perfect example of a loss of control in flight is the accident we covered here:

As to why these are the top risks for helicopter operations, we will come back to in a future article, although we have covered inadvertent entry into IMC here:

💰 Commercial Air Transport (CAT)

What’s commercial air transport? EASA defines it as:

“Any aircraft operation that transports passengers, cargo, or mail for remuneration or other valuable consideration”.

Think of HEMS / Air Ambulance / Offshore / Air Taxi / Sightseeing, anything that involves going from A to B while getting some sort of compensation for it.

The amount of European CAT helicopters as well as AOC holders has remained pretty stable: about 1,882 aircraft across 251 AOC holders. That’s roughly the same as 2023 (1868 helicopters and 259 AOC holders).

So what do the CAT stats look like? Let’s start with the accident types:

EASA Safety Review 2025

So, we have:

🔸 2 fatal accidents
🔸 8 non-fatal accidents
🔸 21 serious incidents

Resulting in:

🔸 4 fatalities
🔸 6 people seriously injured

The most notable thing here is the amount of serious incidents. It was only 1 last year, and 21 this year. This could be due to better reporting cultures, or an actually higher amount of serious incidents (it’s impossible to know for sure at this point in time).

So when did things go wrong the most? Let’s take a look at the different flight phases:

EASA Safety Review 2025

As expected, the cruise and landing phase are still the riskiest. We covered many reasons of this like downwind approaches:

As well as landing site threats:

So which operation did the poorest?

As per usual, HEMS (followed by air taxi):

EASA Safety Review 2025

What’s also worrisome is that we see an uptrend in accidents in the air taxi category again, just like last year.

🛠️ Specialised Helicopter Operations (SPO)

EASA defines Specialised Helicopter Operations as:

“Any operation other than commercial air transport where the aircraft is used for specialised activities such as: agriculture, construction, photography, surveying.”

Think of Construction / Sling Load / Powerline / Aerial Work / Surveillance / etc.

Over the last few years, this is what the accident data looked like:

EASA Safety Review 2025

In 2024, we are looking at:

🔸 1 fatal accident (similar to the average)
🔸 6 non-fatal accidents (slight reduction)
🔸 5 serious incidents (slight increase)

Resulting in:

🔸 1 fatality
🔸 3 people seriously injured

What flight phases were the largest contributors to things going wrong? Take a look:

EASA Safety Review 2025

When it comes to the type of operations, construction / sling loading came with the largest amount of accidents, followed by agricultural operations:

EASA Safety Review 2025

The top 5 here are:

1️⃣ External load related occurrences
2️⃣ Loss of control in flight
3️⃣ Low altitude operations
4️⃣ Unknown (undetermined)
5️⃣ Powerplant failure or malfunction

The powerplant failure is an interesting one to see in the top 5, compared to the other categories, but we are not ready to draw any conclusions from this.

The biggest risks here are obstacle collisions. EASA emphasises:

“Obstacle collision in flight is most risky in terms of aggregated risk, which is not surprising given the conditions and the common environmental factors that come with this type of operation. Helicopter pilots navigate the most harrowing environments known to flight, where recovery has no margin for delayed and human reaction.”

⛳️ Non-Commercial Helicopter Operations (NCO)

Especially here in the UK, non-commercial helicopter operations have had quite a few issues over the years.

Some of it has been cultural, but also stems from the fact that – by design – they come with less strict operational requirements.

NCO pilots often operate single pilot, without flight monitoring, formal SOPs, or robust SMS frameworks. It’s an area that (in our opinion) is still neglected by many local regulators across europe.

Think Training / Test flying / Ferry flights / Leisure flying / sometimes VIP flights / Private owners.

Let’s take a look at the total amount of accident first:

EASA Safety Review 2025

So, last year (2024) we had:

🔸 4 fatal accidents (similar to the average)
🔸 23 non-fatal accidents (slight reduction)
🔸 12 serious incidents (slight increase)

Resulting in

🔸 7 people lost
🔸 5 people seriously injured

As to the type of occurrences, have a look at this:

EASA Safety Review 2025

1️⃣ Loss of control in flight
2️⃣ Unkown (undetermined)
3️⃣ Abnormal runway contact
4️⃣ Powerplant failure or malfuction
5️⃣ loss of control on the ground

So what kind of operations had the most occurrences?

EASA Safety Review 2025

Flight instruction and pleasure flying are the biggest outliers here, just like last year.

The familiar killers persist:

🔸 Low-altitude manoeuvring
🔸 Overconfidence
🔸 Weather underestimation
🔸 Pushing into marginal VMC, especially in valleys or coastal haze, remains a major CFIT trigger
🔸 Maintenance and airworthiness issues
🔸 Privately operated machines sometimes lag on compliance or have deferred snags that would ground a CAT aircraft

💭 Conclusion: What Can we Learn From the Data?

Across all three categories, CAT, SPO, and NCO, the patterns repeat:

🔸 Loss of control remains the biggest threat for helicopter operations
🔸 CFIT is still deadly despite fewer occurances
🔸 Airborne collision risk is increasing
🔸 low altitude and external load operations drive SPO risks
🔸 CAT has had a significant increase in amount of serious incidents
🔸 Training remains the riskiest NCO category
🔸 EASA highlights that human performance deficiencies remain highly relevant for high risk events – technology alone won’t solve for this

But there’s progress. Serious incidents are up while fatal accidents stay flat or down, which could be a sign that the industry is catching problems earlier.

The next frontier is culture: turning data into behaviour change. The EASA review isn’t just numbers, it’s a mirror. If we want to cut those risk lines further, every pilot and operator needs to see their own operation in the trends.

You can find the 2025 EASA Safety Review (covering the 2024 data) that’s it here.

Categories: Why Spotlights

Jop Dingemans

Founder @ Pilots Who Ask Why 🎯 Mastering Aviation - One Question at a Time | AW169 Helicopter Pilot | Aerospace Engineer | Flight Instructor

8 Comments

Pascal Hudziak · November 2, 2025 at 7:29 PM

It might be interesting to open a round the table about a simple question: Did the sudden COVID « stop » in training and checking had an impact on these numbers or not. It is probably impossible to measure it but at least considering it could. It is probably not the only cause but we can maybe agree there was a before and an after COVID …

    Jop Dingemans · November 3, 2025 at 8:28 AM

    Yes very true Pascal, correcting for this is currently very hard based on the data we have.

Anonymous · November 2, 2025 at 4:38 PM

This beeing EASA does not include UK operations. Does the UK CAA publish a similar report?

    Jop Dingemans · November 2, 2025 at 4:56 PM

    Not to our knowledge unfortunately. It’s a shame that the UK isn’t included anymore as it’s obviously a big part of the European helicopter industry.

Keith · November 2, 2025 at 10:58 AM

Thanks for breaking it down and simplifying the information. This type of article gets to far more sets of eyes than big thick complicated reports.
Great job Jop!

    Jop Dingemans · November 2, 2025 at 11:04 AM

    Thank you Keith – appreciate the feedback. Couldn’t do it without Janine though 😁

Peter Moeller · November 2, 2025 at 9:50 AM

Thank you Jop for highlighting the details of the 2025 EASA Safety Review. It helps increasing the awareness to the weak points of our industry. Hopefully it will contribute to the reduction of the numbers in the future. Obviously, the increasing number of restrictive regulation in the past years did not lead to an improvement of safety. It´s the mindset of the crews and operators which needs to change! And this cannot be regulated!

    Jop Dingemans · November 2, 2025 at 11:03 AM

    Thank you so much Peter – we fully agree. Culture and mindset is by far the hardest to change.

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