Fatal AW139 Crash after Departure in Fog at Night

We have two pilots in an AW139 helicopter, about to fly from a private site to Coventry in the U.K.

The plan? A vertical departure ⬆️

The result? Total loss of the aircraft and everyone on board – less than a minute after takeoff 💥

So how does that happen?

Not from an engine failure. Not from an instrument malfunction, but from something a bit more insidious.

We’ve broken down the fatal 2014 crash of an AW139 (G-LBAL) near Gillingham Hall, Norfolk.

So:

🔸 What happened?

🔸 Why did it happen?

🔸 And most importantly: what can we learn from this?

If you fly helicopters – especially IFR or at night – this one’s for you!

Let’s have a look ⤵️

We don’t publish all our Notes from the Cockpit (like this one) publicly, some are shared only by email. Get the next one sent straight to your inbox ⤵️

Accident Overview

On 13 March 2014, an AW139 helicopter (G-LBAL) crashed during departure from a private site near Gillingham Hall, Norfolk. The flight was conducted at night in foggy conditions, with two pilots and two passengers on board, who were all fatally injured.

The helicopter was destroyed on impact. The commander, acting as Pilot Flying, attempted a vertical departure in poor visibility, but rapidly pitched the aircraft nose-down. The aircraft reached a nose down attitude of up to 35 degrees below the horizon, a significant rate of descent, and gained forward speed before impacting the ground approximately 420 metres from the helipad.

No mechanical faults were found, and both engines were functioning at the time of impact.

Timeline of Events

Before the accident flight, the crew departed Northern Ireland around midday and landed at Gillingham Hall at approximately 17:20 UTC, after stopping to refuel at Peterborough Conington.

It departed Conington at 15:35 UTC and arrived at the private site (Gillingham Hall) at 17:20 UTC:

During the flight, the co-pilot expressed concern about worsening weather conditions:

Co-Pilot:

“Is he aware of the weather situation is he”

Commander:

“Told (name of the personal assistant)”

Co-Pilot:

Yeah I know that (pause), what I am saying is are you going to tell him”

Commander:

““No… **** It it’s down to them (pause) if he asks I’ll tell him (pause) I said I’ll check the weather when i get to Norwich and give them an update (pause) that’s what I’ll do”

Co-Pilot:

“If I had my case with me I wouldn’t mind you being so bold (pause) but (pause) the only people who’ll lose out is probably me and you.”

(The investigation assumed that the Co-Pilot was referring to a case for an overnight away from base)

They landed at Gillingham Hall without issues, waiting for the next flight with the passengers.

As evening approached, fog started to set in. Visibility deteriorated rapidly, with local observers reporting conditions of just tens of metres.

The original departure time of 18:30 was delayed because the passengers were not ready. By 19:20, the fog had thickened, prompting one of the pilots to challenge the other:

“I don’t mind telling you I’m not very happy about lifting out of here”

The other replied:

“It should be ok it’s… I don’t think it is because you can still see the moon”

At 19:24, the helicopter lifted from the helipad and hover-taxied to the centre of the field near the helipad.

The commander stated his intention: “

“Right all I’m going to do, take it over to the centre of the field, and then just pull the power, we’ll go vertically up, I’ll go for the strobe and just make sure the heading bug is central for us if you can”.

There were no mentions of how a forward transition was going to be achieved, and no speeds or heights were talked about either.

The aircraft initially climbed nearly vertically. At around 32 feet above ground level (AGL), it began to pitch progressively nose-down while accelerating forward. This was not briefed and deviated from the usual vertical profile.

At 120 ft AGL the co-pilot said:

“Nose down [commander’s first name].”

It’s unclear whether this was an observation or an instruction, but additional forward cyclic input was made, increasing nose-down pitch.

The co-pilot repeated:

“Nose down”

It could (again) not be concluded if this was an observation or a request.

The helicopter continued to descend and accelerate, ultimately reaching a 35° nose-down attitude while descending through 100 ft AGL. The engine torques increased but the rotor speed could not be kept at 102% and started to reduce.

At 82 ft AGL, the helicopter was descending at 2,400 ft/min with a ground speed of 90 kt. The rotors were over-torqued, and rotor RPM was dropping below safe limits. The last nose attitude was recorded as 25°.

Here is the graph that shows the pitch of the nose and the associated height AGL:

The helicopter struck hay bales, broke apart, and the main rotor blades struck the ground. It then tumbled and came to rest – resulting in a complete hull loss.

Investigation Findings

The investigation came to several findings that are all very relevant to learning as much as possible from this accident:

🔸 Weather – The Met Office provided an aftercast:

“An area of high pressure was centred over the UK with very light winds affecting the area. It was a rather hazy afternoon with visibilities generally between 5000 M and 8 KM. Conditions deteriorated further through the late afternoon with much of Norfolk affected by mist, and in coastal areas, such as North Denes, dense fog developed between 1620 and 1650 UTC.”

And:

“On light east to northeasterly winds this dense fog gradually crept further inland reaching Norwich Airfield by 2020 UTC. This would suggest that visibility in the Gillingham area would have deteriorated in to fog prior to this time.”

This was backed up by eye witnesses and CCTV footage, which confirmed fog was present at the site during the departure.

🔸 A causal factor was spatial disorientation – specifically somatogravic illusion, where forward acceleration was misinterpreted as a nose-up pitch. The commander likely applied nose-down cyclic in response, worsening the descent.

🔸The crew had no formal training in vertical departures in degraded visual environments (DVEs). Despite briefing for a vertical departure, the commander transitioned to forward flight without clear reference to instruments or a safe plan. The pitch attitude became abnormally nose-down as the helicopter climbed through 78 ft AGL.

🔸 Cockpit audio revealed that formal crew coordination was lacking—briefings were minimal, and roles were poorly defined. The co-pilot’s ambiguous “nose down” call may have unintentionally reinforced the commander’s disoriented response.

🔸 The helicopter was airworthy. Both engines were functioning normally and delivering power at impact. No system failures or control malfunctions were identified.

🔸 No multipilot typerating was completed by either pilot, and the flight was technically flown in a single pilot format. The crew had received no training in multi crew coordination.

🔸 Visibility was poor due to dense fog and lack of cultural lighting. Departing from a private site, the pilots had no access to official visibility reports and likely relied on inconsistent visual cues, such as headlights from a moving vehicle, which may have further misled them.

🔸 Regulatory gaps: Because the flight was private, it was exempt from many requirements that apply to commercial operations—including minimum visibility limits, formal crew resource management training, and mandatory safety management systems.

🔸 In 2014, the CAA published a safety notice stating:

“The commander of the aircraft has certain legal and airmanship obligations to fulfil in relation to ensuring that the flight can be safely made whether day or night, under the Visual Flight Rules (VFR) or the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR).

And:

“This is of particular importance when planning to depart IFR, in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) or at night, from a site where instrument procedures and aids are not available or established.”

And:

“Where no IFR departure procedures have been established, it is recommended that private and aerial work flights apply the VFR night visibility minima of 3,000 metres for take-off’.”

What can we Learn From This?

🔸 Degraded Visual Environment (DVE) Operations Require Training

Night time and fog are still underestimated risk factors in the industry. Performing a vertical departure in fog is not an option for many civilian aircraft or pilots. Inadvertent Entry into IMC kills, we’ve discussed this in depth here:

Inadvertent IMC: Are you Truly Prepared?

While the military has a DVE syllabus, this is not recognised in the civilian world and should be avoided at all times, unless under a company approval. Spatial disorientation is a serious risk, especially at low altitudes where there might not be enough time to react.

🔸 Commercial pressure can result in irrational decisions

Pilots being directly employed by a private owner can cause a lot of psychological effects that go against flight safety. Of course it’s possible to operate in this way without any safety concerns, but owners should be educated on how not to influence pilots.

We’ve covered commercial pressure here:

Let’s Talk About Commercial Pressure in Aviation

Discussion with industry participants during the investigation of the accident involving G-LBAL indicates that increased regulation is not a complete solution if these pressures cause pilots to operate a flight in violation of the regulations, and that mitigating the pressures themselves is necessary to improve safety.

🔸 Multi Crew Coordination and standard calls are crucial for flight safety

Standard calls and SOPs aren’t just some random rules that we’re told to follow. They are there after many many incidents, accidents, and lost lives.

Vague communication can be easily avoided by knowing your standard calls. When there’s not time to ask additional questions, it can save your life.

If the crew were multi crew trained this could’ve been avoided.

🔸 Regulatory oversight is insufficient for complex private operations

It’s pretty clear that, at least in the UK, private operations with complex types are a problematic area due to a lack of oversight.

While holders of an Air Operator Certificate (AOC) have to comply with strict regulations, private operators can get away with a lot of things that are just a matter of time before things go wrong.

More regulation and oversight is needed in this area, to protect pilots as well as passengers from unsafe practices.

Conclusion

The AW139 crash at Gillingham Hall wasn’t caused by a technical failure. It was caused by human factors: disorientation, poor coordination, and a decision to fly in marginal conditions without the proper training, procedures, or support.

It’s easy to point fingers after the fact. But the truth is, many of us have felt the same pressures: to launch, to keep the customer happy, to believe that this time we’ll be fine.

That’s why this case matters.

If we don’t train for the threats, if we don’t speak up, if we don’t build systems that protect us from our own biases – then history will keep repeating itself.

Whether you’re in the left seat, the right seat, or running a flight operation: we all have a role in breaking the chain.

Let’s learn from G-LBAL – so we’re not reading about another version of it next year.

Link to the official report here.

We don’t publish all our Notes from the Cockpit (like this one) publicly, some are shared only by email. Get the next one sent straight to your inbox ⤵️